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1 Introduction
It is generally attributed to Arthur B. La¤er in 1974 the point that "there are always two tax rates
that yield the same revenues" (see, e.g., Wanniski, 1978). While simple, this idea has important
implications for the government agencies that dene the scal policy. This work investigates how the
di¤erent characteristics of the rm a¤ect the corporate income tax rate that maximizes tax revenues
(i.e., the maximal tax rate). In turn, this analysis allows us to explain the variability observed in
the maximal tax rates across sectors or industries in the U.S. economy. These results may guide
targeted scal policies that contemplate the specic situation of the di¤erent U.S. industries. Last
but not least, we evaluate the maximal tax rate over the business cycle and nd that it is procyclical.
Using a dynamic model of the rm, we start computing the maximal tax rate for a representative
rm in the U.S. and nd it to be around 66%. This result is consistent with Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011), who nd a maximal tax rate of around 65% for the U.S. economy. We then study the
e¤ect of the di¤erent primitive features of the rm (e.g., the curvature of the production function,
the persistence of prot shocks, etc.) on that maximal rate. We nd that the concavity of the
production function is the main corporate determinant of the tax rate that maximizes tax revenues.
As we describe below in more detail, the reason for such a large e¤ect is that the capital decision is
the main driver of the tax base (i.e., pre-tax income in our model), and optimal capital is strongly
a¤ected by the curvature of the production function. Additionally, we nd that the market cost of
capital and the operating costs are rm features with a signicant e¤ect on the maximal tax rate.
We next perform an analysis of the maximal tax rate across rms in di¤erent SIC industries,
aggregated at the division level (i.e., Construction, Manufacturing, Services, etc.) We nd that
those maximal rates vary between 64% and 76%, with the Services industry in the lower end and
the Mining industry in the upper end of that range. As expected, the structural reason of the
observed variability is the fact that these industries di¤er from each other in all of their primitive
characteristics, specially the ones described in the previous paragraph. These results also suggest
that, given the current corporate income tax rates below 50% (federal plus state taxes), all U.S.
industries are still far from the prohibitive range of the La¤er curve, and that an increase in the
corporate income tax rate would augment the tax revenue from all of them (at the cost of decreasing
shareholderswealth).
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Finally, we study the evolution of the maximal tax rate over the business cycle and nd that
it has a procyclical behavior. That is, the maximal rate increases during economic expansions,
and vice versa. The reason for this behavior is that the optimal capital of the rm increases in
periods of high prots. This larger optimal capital augments the tax base, which, in turn, induces
an increment in the maximal tax rate.
Our dynamic rm model is based on the separation principle.1 According to this principle,
assuming perfect capital markets, the rm manager maximizes the lifetime expected utility of all
current shareholders by maximizing the current price of the stock, independently of their individual
subjective preferences. It follows that the model does not require any assumption about equityhold-
ersutility functions, as long as we discount future cash ows with an appropriately risk-adjusted
discount rate. For that reason, plus the fact that we are studying the behavior of the maximal tax
rate at the industry level, we simplify the analysis of the rm to a partial equilibrium framework.
By focusing on the corporate determinants of the maximal tax rate as well as on the observed
variability in that maximal rate across U.S. industries, our work contributes to the large literature
studying the di¤erent aspects of the so-called La¤er curves. For instance, the closest work is
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011, 2012), who study capital and labor La¤er curves for the U.S. and
14 European countries under di¤erent parameterizations of constant Frisch elasticity preferences.
Lindsey (1987) studies the response of taxpayers to the personal tax reductions occurred in the
U.S. during 1982-1984 and analyzes their implications regarding tax revenue maximization. Using
an endogenous growth model, Ireland (1994) shows that there exists a dynamic La¤er curve with
respect to capital income taxes. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) nd that there is a labor income
La¤er curve in the steady state in the context of a neoclassical growth model. Floden-Lindé (2001)
do a thorough analysis of labor income La¤er curves for di¤erent calibrations of model parameters.2
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we solve the dynamic model of the rm in
closed-form and dene the value of corporate income tax revenue. In Section 3, we study how
the di¤erent corporate determinants a¤ect the maximal income tax rate. The computation of the
maximal tax rate for each of the di¤erent SIC industries is in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1See, for example, Copeland, Weston, and Shastri (2005) for a more complete discussion of the separation principle.
2The list of important papers in this literature is large, including, but not limited to, Bender (1984), Malcomson
(1986), Pecorino (1995), Agell and Persson (2001), Novales and Ruiz (2002), and Jonsson and Klein (2003).
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Appendix 1 contains the proofs, while Appendix 2 describes the calibration of model parameters.
2 A Dynamic Model of the Firm
In this section we derive an analytic solution of the dynamic model of the rm and dene the value
of the corporate income tax revenue.
The CEO of the rm selects the level of capital and debt in every period (e.g., quarter, year,
etc.) such that they maximize the market value of equity. We write a tilde on variable X (i.e., eX)
to indicate that it is growing over time. The rm uses capital eKt in period t, which depreciates at
constant rate  2 [0; 1] in each period. The debt of the rm is denoted by variable eDt and we assume
it expires in one period. For simplicity, we let the coupon rate cB be equal to the market cost of
debt rB, which makes the book value of debt eDt equal the market value of debt eBt. Following
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011), we assume the debt is risk-free in order to incorporate
the phenomenon of debt conservatism described by Graham (2000).3 In this context, the risk-free
interest rate, rf , and the market cost of debt, rB, are equal.
We introduce randomness into the model through the prot shock, zt, which follows an AR(1)
process in logs
ln (zt) = ln (c) +  ln (zt 1) + "t (1)
where c > 0 is the constant of the log-process,  2 (0; 1) is the auto-regressive coe¢ cient that
denes the persistence of prot shocks, and "t is an iid normal random term with mean 0 and
variance 2.
In each period, the net prots of the rm are given by the following function
eNt = h(1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt   f eKt    eKt   rB eBti (1  ) (2)
where (1 + g)t(1 ) represents the level of technology in period t and implies the rm grows at
constant rate g  0 in each period. The elasticity of capital is given by parameter  2 (0; 1), the
operating costs are denoted by f > 0, and the corporate income tax rate is indicated by  2 [0; 1).4
3Lazzati and Menichini (2014a) show that these assumptions about debt generate a leverage behavior that is
consistent with several important results described by the corporate nance literature.
4We also assume (f + ) (1  )  1 to guarantee that the stock price is weakly positive.
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Finally, the dividend paid by the rm to shareholders in period t is
eLt = eNt   h eKt+1   eKt   eBt+1   eBti : (3)
We let rS indicate the market cost of equity and rA denote the market cost of capital. In
addition, to guarantee the existence of the market value of equity, we assume that the market cost
of capital exceeds the growth rate (i.e., rA > g).




, such that the market value of equity is maximized. Letting E0
indicate the expectation operator given information at t = 0 (i.e., eK0; eB0; z0), the stock price can
therefore be written as








subject to the restriction of risk-free debt. Formally, we say debt is risk-free if, in every period,
the after-shock book value of equity is weakly positive (i.e., if net prots plus assets, eNt + eKt, are
su¢ cient to cover debt, eBt). This condition is analogous to a weakly positive net-worth covenant,
which is usually included in short-term debt contracts (see, e.g., Leland, 1994), and is consistent
with the one-period debt in our model.
We solve equation (4) in closed-form and nd the following expression for the stock price.
Proposition 1 The optimal decisions of the rm are given by
eKt+1 (zt) = (1 + g)t+1E [zt+1jzt] 11  W  and eBt+1 (zt) = ` eKt+1 (zt) (5)
where E [zt+1jzt] = czt e
1
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The optimal book leverage ratio is given by
` =
1  (f + ) (1  )
1 + rB (1  ) : (7)
The market value of equity is
eSt  eKt; eBt; zt = h(1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt   f eKt    eKt   rB eBti (1  ) + eKt   eBt + fMt (zt)P  (8)
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where function fMt (zt) can be expressed as
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The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix 1. We now describe its di¤erent parts.
Expression (5) shows optimal next-period capital, eKt+1 (zt), as an explicit function of rm
characteristics. As expected, we observe that it decreases with the market cost of capital rA,
operating costs f , and depreciation  because they decrease the expected productivity of capital
via equation (2). For analogous reasons, optimal assets increase with the growth rate g, the drift
parameter c, and the volatility of innovations . The e¤ect of  and  depends on the current value
of prot shock zt, but it is generally positive for standard values of the parameters. Expression (5)
also shows that all these characteristics have the same directional e¤ects on the optimal next-period
debt, eBt+1 (zt). Lastly, the income tax rate  has a negative e¤ect on optimal assets as they become
less protable. It also has a negative e¤ect on optimal debt for the great majority of parameter
values, including those used in this paper.
Optimal debt in equation (5) is a constant proportion ` of optimal assets.5 Fraction ` repre-
sents the target leverage of the rm and shows the level of debt that maximizes share price while
it keeps debt risk-free. This result is consistent with Graham and Harvey (2001), who provide
empirical evidence suggesting that most surveyed rms actually have some form of target leverage.
Equation (8) shows the market value of equity, which represents an analytic solution of the
Gordon Growth Model in the dynamic and stochastic setting. While the rst three terms on the
right-hand side of equation (8) represent the after-shock book value of equity, the last term is the
going-concern value.
5The derivation of ` is in Appendix 1.
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Finally, the corporate income tax revenue can be dened as the present value of the current
and future corporate income tax payments. Given the results in Proposition 1, we can express the
value of the corporate income tax proceeds in the following way.
Corollary 2 The value of the corporate income tax revenue is given by
eRt  eKt; eBt; zt =  h(1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt   f eKt    eKt   rB eBti+
fMt (zt) hW    fW    W     1+rA1+rB  rB`W i : (12)
The rst term in equation (12) represents the income tax payment in the current period, while
the second term indicates the present value of the expected future income tax payments. The latter
is a function of the future stream of optimal rm decisions and, as Proposition 1 shows, it depends
explicitly on all the fundamental features of the rm (i.e., the curvature of the production function,
the persistence of prot shocks, etc.) Finally, we dene the maximal tax rate () as the value
of the income tax rate () that maximizes eRt  eKt; eBt; zt. Unfortunately, there is not an analytic
expression for , so we compute it numerically. In the next section, we evaluate how each of
these primitive rm characteristics a¤ect the present value of the corporate income tax payments
described in equation (12).
3 The Determinants of the Corporate Income Tax Revenue
In this section, we study the determinants of the corporate income tax revenue. We rst construct
the La¤er curve for a representative rm in the U.S. and then analyze the impact of the di¤erent
fundamental features of the rm on the maximal tax rate. Finally, we explore how the maximal
tax rate evolves over the business cycle.
We begin our analysis dening the base case parameterization of the model. This parame-
terization is standard in the corporate nance literature (see, e.g., Hennessy and Whited, 2007;
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited, 2011; and Lazzati and Menichini, 2014b) and aims to represent
the average rm in the Compustat database. We set the elasticity of capital () at 0.65, the volatil-
ity of prot shocks () at 0.20, and the persistence of prot innovations () at 0.75. The operating
costs (f) and the capital depreciation rate () equal 0.25 and 0.05, respectively. In addition, we set
the corporate income tax rate () at 0.35, the market cost of debt (rB) at 0.02, the market cost of
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capital (rA) at 0.08, and the long-run growth rate (g) at 0.01. Finally, we normalize parameter c
to 1 because we are interested in evaluating a representative rm.6 This parameterization refers to
a yearly period and is summarized in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 here]
To simplify the analysis, we initialize the state of the model by assuming that the rm is at the
outset of its life (i.e., t = 0) and the state








(1 2) , eK0 = c 11  e 122 1(1 2) 11  W , and eB0 = ` eK0: (13)
With the parameterization described above, the initial state turns out to be z0 = 1:05, eK0 = 3:89,
and eB0 = 3:09.
Table 2 shows the income tax base (i.e., pre-tax income), the tax proceeds, and the stock price
for the base case income tax rate ( = 0:35) as well as for the maximal tax rate (). As we dened
in Section 2, the latter is the one that maximizes the income tax revenue for the government and
turns out to be 66.33% for our representative rm. The income tax revenue is 7.92 with the base
case tax rate and increases to 11.71 with the maximal rate, roughly a 48% increment. However,
the growth in the income tax proceeds comes at the cost of a substantial reduction in the tax base
and share price. With a tax rate of 35% the tax base is 22.62 and the market value of equity is
11.47, while with the maximal tax rate of 66.33% those values fall to 17.66 and 4.78, respectively.
These changes imply a reduction of approximately 22% in the tax base and 58% in the stock price.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Figure 1 shows the La¤er curve associated with the corporate income tax, as well as the tax
base and share price for the representative rm. The three lines are normalized to 100% at the
base case (i.e.,  = 0:35). As expected, the income tax revenue increases monotonically as the
tax rate goes up, until the latter equals the maximal rate (i.e.,  = 0:6633). At that point the
income tax revenue is around 48% more than in the base case. Above the maximal rate the tax
6This normalization is common in the corporate nance literature.
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revenue falls steadily. Additionally, the gure shows clearly that the tax base and the stock price
fall monotonically as the tax rate rises. Overall, these results are in line with the evidence reported
by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), who nd maximal capital income tax rates close to 65% for the U.S.
economy.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
We next explore the corporate determinants of the maximal tax rate, . To this end, we
perform a comparative statics analysis that shows how that maximal rate changes as we vary the
fundamental features of the rm. This type of analysis allows us to understand the directional
e¤ect of those primitive characteristics as well as to pinpoint those with the greatest impact on the
maximal tax rate. Accordingly, we start with the base case parameterization outlined above and
change those values by up to  20%.
Table 3 presents the results of this sensitivity analysis. It is clear that the curvature of the
production function () is the main determinant of the maximal tax rate. For instance,
for the base case parameter value of  = 0:65, the maximal rate is 66.33%, while that rate falls to
53.34% when  goes up to 0.78. In other words,  has a strongly negative e¤ect on the maximal
rate . As we mentioned above, the reason for such a large impact is that the elasticity of capital
in the production function denes the marginal productivity of capital, which, in turn, determines
optimal capital. This fact can be observed in equations (5) and (6), where  appears as one of
the main determinants. Equation (12) then shows that optimal capital denes the tax base and,
ultimately, the maximal tax rate.
The market cost of capital (rA) and the operating costs (f) are also important
parameters. A 20% increment in rA from 0.08 to 0.096 reduces the maximal tax rate from
66.33% to 64.36%, while a similar proportional increment in f (i.e., from 0.25 to 0.30) augments
that maximal rate from 66.33% to 68.25%. The other parameters play a smaller role regarding the
maximal tax rate.
[Insert Table 3 here]
We end the section studying the time-series behavior of the maximal tax rate. For this analysis,
we simulate the model over 100 periods with the base case parameterization described above. Figure
9
2 exhibits the stochastic evolution of the prot shock, zt, and the maximal tax rate over time. It
is evident that the maximal rate (solid line) is positively related to the prot shock (dashed line).
This result suggests that the maximal tax rate is procyclical over the business cycle,
that is, periods of high prot shocks are followed by high maximal tax rates, and vice
versa. The structural reason behind this behavior is that, as shown in equation (5), optimal capital
is positively associated with the prot shocks. Then, during economic expansions, optimal assets
increase, which, as suggested by equation (12), induces an increment in the tax base and, thus, the
maximal tax rate. This nding could help the government to adjust the corporate income tax rates
over the economic booms and depressions.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
4 Cross-Industry Analysis
In the previous section, we showed that the maximal tax rate for a representative rm in the
U.S. is around 66% and evaluated its main corporate determinants. We now extend the previous
analysis to rms in di¤erent SIC industries, aggregated at the division level, such as Mining,
Construction, Manufacturing, etc. These rms di¤er from each other with respect to all of their
primitive characteristics, specially the curvature of the production function (), the market cost of
capital (rA), and the operating costs (f). Accordingly, they turn out to have dissimilar maximal
tax rates. We use Compustat data to compute the model parameters for each industry and show
their values in Table 4. Appendix 2 describes the data items used to calibrate the parameters for
each industry.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The last column in Table 4 shows the results from the cross-sectional comparison of maximal
tax rates. It is clear that the maximal tax rate exhibits some variability across industries and is
in the range of 64%-76%. The Mining industry exhibits the highest maximal tax rate at 76.04%
because its operating costs are larger than in most of the other industries, while at the same time
its market cost of capital is lower than in most other industries. As we saw in the previous section,
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this parameter combination tends to yield a higher maximal tax rate. On the other extreme is the
Services industry, which has a maximal tax rate of 64.82%. In this case, the e¤ects of the high
operating costs are compensated by the impact of the high market cost of capital, producing a low
maximal tax rate.
Regarding the location of the individual U.S. industries on the corporate income
tax La¤er curve, our results suggest that all of them are still far from the prohibitive
range of that curve, given that the current income tax rates (including federal plus
state taxes) are below 50%. Thus, further increments in the corporate income tax
rate would increase the income tax revenue from all of those industries. However, as
we showed in the previous section, those larger tax payments would be at the cost of lower stock
prices.
5 Conclusion
We use a dynamic model of the rm to ascertain the main determinants of the corporate income tax
rate that maximizes tax revenues (i.e., the maximal tax rate). For a reasonable parameterization
of the dynamic model, we nd that the curvature of the production function, the market cost of
capital, and the operating costs are the primitive characteristics of the rm with the greatest impact
on the maximal tax rate. In addition, we nd that the maximal tax rate evolves procyclically over
the business cycle.
Regarding the value of the maximal tax rate, we nd that it is around 66% for a representative
rm in the U.S. Furthermore, we calculate the maximal tax rate for the di¤erent U.S. industries
and nd that it varies within the range 64%-76%, with the Services and Mining industries at the
lower and upper ends of that range, respectively. This result has interesting implications for scal
policy. Given the current corporate income tax rates in the U.S. below 50% (including federal and
state taxes), all U.S. industries are on the upward sloping side of the La¤er curve. This nding
suggests that, in principle, rising the corporate income tax rate would increase the tax proceeds
from all of them (at the expense of equityholdersvalue).
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6 Appendix 1: Proofs
The proof of Proposition 1 requires an intermediate result that we present next.
Lemma 3 Restricting debt to be risk-free, the maximum level of book leverage in each period is
given by
` =
1  (f + ) (1  )
1 + rB (1  ) : (14)
Proof We say debt is risk-free if, in every period, the following inequality is true for all z0
 
z0K 0
   fK 0   K 0   rB`K 0

(1  ) +K 0   `K 0  0: (15)
That is, risk-free debt implies that next-period, after-shock book value of equity must be weakly
positive for all z0.7 In other words, net prots,
 
z0K 0   fK 0   K 0   rB`K 0

(1  ), plus the value
of assets, K 0, must be su¢ cient to cover debt, `K 0.
Given that the worst-case scenario is z0 = 0, the maximum book leverage ratio consistent with
risk-free debt, `, satises
  fK 0   K 0   rB`K 0 (1  ) +K 0   `K 0 = 0: (16)
Working on the previous expression, we can derive the maximum level of book leverage as
` =
1  (f + ) (1  )
1 + rB (1  ) (17)
which completes the proof.8 
Proof of Proposition 1
The maximization in equation (4) requires a normalization of growing variables that keeps the
expectation of the payo¤ function in the future periods bounded. This normalization is equivalent
to the one used to nd the solution of the canonical Gordon Growth Model. Let vector eXt =n eKt; eBt; eNt; eLt; eSto contain the growing variables of the model. We then transform vector eXt in
7The same result is true if we dene risk-free debt using the market value of equity as opposed to the book value
of equity. That is, in both cases we arrive at equation (14) as the maximum level of book leverage consistent with
risk-free debt. To simplify notation, we use the book value of equity.
8The restriction (f + ) (1  )  1 described in Section 2 also guarantees that `  0.
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the following way: Xt = eXt=(1 + g)t. Using the normalized variables and modifying the payo¤
function accordingly, the market value of equity can be expressed as









subject to keeping debt risk-free. Because we use the Adjusted Present Value method of rm
valuation, we solve the problem of the rm in equation (18) in three steps. First, we determine the
value of the unlevered rm, Su0 (K0; z0). Second, we solve for optimal debt and compute the present
value of the nancing side e¤ects. Finally, we obtain the value of the levered rm in equation (18).
The market value of equity for the unlevered rm can be expressed as









where Lut = Nut (Kt+1  Kt) andNut = (ztKt   fKt   Kt) (1  ). We let normalized variables
with primes indicate values in the next period and normalized variables with no primes denote
current values. Then, the Bellman equation for the problem of the rm in equation (19) is given
by
Su (K; z) = max
K0










We use the guess and verify method as the proof strategy. Thus, we start by guessing that the
solution is given by
Su (K; z) = (zK
   fK   K) (1  ) +K +M (z)P u (21)
where


























We obtained this initial guess as the solution of equation (20) by the backward induction method.
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We now verify our guess. To this end, let us write








with F dened as the objective function in equation (20).










z0jzK 1   f    (1  ) + 1 = 0 (26)
and optimal capital turns out to be
K = E

z0jz 11  W  (27)
where W  is as in equation (24).
Finally, the market value of equity for the unlevered rm becomes
Su (K; z) = (zK
   fK   K) (1  )  (1 + g)K +K+
(1+g)
(1+rA)
[(E [z0jz]K   fK   K) (1  ) +K+
E [M (z0) jz]P u ]




E [z0jz] 11   W    fW    W  (1  ) +W +
E [M (z0) jz]P ug














+ E [M (z0) jz]

P u
= (zK   fK   K) (1  ) +K +M (z)P u
(28)
which is equivalent to our initial guess in equation (21).






B0 [1 + rB (1  )]

(29)
subject to the restriction of risk-free debt. Because  > 0, the rm increases debt as much as
possible (as long as it remains risk-free) to maximize the tax benets of debt. Then, optimal debt
is B = `K where
` =
1  (f + ) (1  )
1 + rB (1  ) ; (30)
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where M (z) is as in equation (22). Under this nancial policy, the amount of debt and interest
payments will vary with the future asset cash ows (i.e., they depend on future rm performance).
Then, because future interest tax shields will have a level of risk in line with that of the rm cash
ows, we use the cost of capital, rA, as the discount rate.
The third step consists in obtaining the market value of equity for the levered rm. If we assume
the rm used debt B in the previous period, and now has to pay interest rBB (1  ), then the
stock price for the levered rm is






W   B   rBB (1  )
= (zK   fK   K   rBB) (1  ) +K  B +M (z)P 
(32)









The last part of the proof consists in transforming normalized variables back into growing
variables. For this step, we return to the initial notation with growing variables, where next-
period assets are eKt+1 and current-period assets are eKt. Then, the required transformation is:eXt = (1 + g)tXt, where vector Xt = fKt; Bt; Nt; Lt; Stg contains the normalized variables of the
model. Finally, the optimal decisions of the rm with growing variables are given by
eKt+1 (zt) = (1 + g)t+1E [zt+1jzt] 11  W  and eBt+1 (zt) = ` eKt+1 (zt) (34)
and the growing market value of equity is
eSt  eKt; eBt; zt = h(1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt   f eKt    eKt   rB eBti (1  ) + eKt   eBt + fMt (zt)P  (35)
as shown in Proposition 1. 
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7 Appendix 2: Calibration of Model Parameters
We need to nd parameter values for c; ; ; ; f; ;  ; rB; rA; and g for each SIC industry at the
division level. We then calibrate the model using Compustat annual data for all rms in each SIC
code. The sample covers the period 1990-2014 and includes a total of 59,803 rm-year observations.
In order to obtain parameter f , we average the ratio Selling, General, and Administrative
Expense (XSGA)/Assets - Total (AT) for all rm-years in each industry. We follow the same
procedure to get  as the ratio of Depreciation and Amortization (DP) over Assets - Total (AT),
and  as the fraction Income Taxes - Total (TXT)/Pretax Income (PI). We trim these ratios at the
lower and upper one-percentiles to reduce the e¤ect of outliers and errors in the data. Following
Moyen (2004), we obtain parameters ; ; and  for each industry using the rms autoregressive
prot shock process of equation (1) and the gross prots function in equation (2), (1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt .
The data we use with these equations are Gross Prot (GP) and Assets - Total (AT). Given that
we are working with representative rms, we set c = 1 for each industry. We keep the assumption
that the risk-free interest rate (rf = rB) is 0.02. We derive rA using CAPM with the corresponding
(unlevered) industry betas estimated by Fama and French (1997) and assuming an expected market
return (rM ) of 0.08. Finally, we obtain g for each industry following Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
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Figure 1. Corporate Income Tax Revenue, Tax Base, and Share Price. The gure exhibits
the income tax proceeds (solid line), the tax base (dotted line), and the market value of equity (dashed line)
for di¤erent values of the income tax rate (). The three lines are normalized to 100% at the base case (i.e.,
 = 0:35).
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Figure 2. Maximal Tax Rate and Prot Shocks. The gure exhibits the evolution over time of
the maximal tax rate (solid line, right Y-axis) as well as the prot shocks (dashed line, left Y-axis). The
model is simulated over 100 periods with the parameterization described in Table 1.
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Table 1
Base Case Parameter Values
The table presents the values used to parameterize the base case of the dynamic model of the rm. The
parameters are the drift in logs (c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the
innovation term (), the concavity of the production function (), the operating costs (f), the capital
depreciation rate (), the corporate income tax rate (), the market cost of debt (rB), the market cost of
capital (rA), and the growth rate (g).
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Table 2
Corporate Income Tax and the Maximal Tax Rate
The table exhibits the base case () and maximal () tax rates. It also shows the corporate income tax
base, the tax proceeds, and market equity corresponding to both tax rates.
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Table 3
Comparative Statics Analysis of the Maximal Tax Rate
The table shows the maximal tax rate () for di¤erent values of the model parameters. The column labeled
Base Case contains the base case parameter values described in Table 1 while the other columns contain
proportional changes of those initial values. The parameters are the drift in logs (c), the persistence of prot
shocks (), the standard deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity of the production function (),
the operating costs (f), the capital depreciation rate (), the market cost of debt (rB), the market cost of
capital (rA), and the growth rate (g).
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Table 4
Cross-Sectional Parameter Values and the Maximal Tax Rate
The table presents the values used to parameterize the dynamic model of the rm for the di¤erent SIC
industries. The parameters are the drift in logs (c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard
deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity of the production function (), the operating costs (f),
the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate income tax rate (), the market cost of debt (rB), the market
cost of capital (rA), and the growth rate (g). The last column exhibits the maximal tax rate () for each
industry.
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